Asia Power Index 2024 : New Zealand's Place in the Region
2 October 2024
Sydney-based think tank the Lowy Institute has released its annual assessment of the relative power of different countries in Asia. So where does New Zealand rank?
The Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index is an annual assessment of the changing distribution of power in Asia. The Index ranks 27 countries in Asia according to eight measures of power – from economic and military capability to diplomacy and cultural influence. The full findings can be accessed via the Lowy Institute.
This year, the United States remains the most powerful country, followed by China. A large gap exists between these two superpowers, and the rest of the region’s “middle powers”, even large countries like India and Japan lag well behind, with overall power scores around half that of China.
So where does New Zealand fit in? New Zealand is a middle power, ranking 13th overall, just behind Vietnam, which overtook it for 12th place in 2020, and slightly ahead of Taiwan. Of note, New Zealand’s score has declined steadily since 2020, a decline of around 18 per cent.
New Zealand has had small declines since 2020 in most measures of the Asia Power Index, including economic capability, military capability, resilience and economic relationships. However, in two measures, it’s score has dropped more dramatically: defence networks and diplomatic influence.
Defence networks – partnerships that can help multiply autonomous military capability – have traditionally been a strong suit for New Zealand, and the country continues to rank sixth for this measure.
However, since 2020 New Zealand’s score for this measure has declined by about 30 per cent. New Zealand’s absolute participation in combined military exercises and defence dialogues has not declined.
Wellington has largely remained outside a massive upswing in defence cooperation among the United States and allies such as Japan, Australia, South Korea and the Philippines, which has seen New Zealand’s relative score go down.
Likewise, when it comes to diplomatic influence, New Zealand has lost nearly 30 per cent of its 2020 score. This measure comprises both quantitative metrics, like the size of a countries’ diplomatic networks and the number of international engagements by leaders and foreign ministers, as well as qualitative assessments of experts on countries’ political leadership and strategic ambition.
Expert appraisals of New Zealand’s leadership in 2024 were much less positive than in previous editions of the Index, with the country falling from 6th to 13th place for regional leadership and 10th to 14th place for global leadership and strategic ambition. This may in part reflect lower international recognition of New Zealand’s current and former prime ministers, as compared to Jacinda Ardern.
On quantitative metrics, New Zealand has been much less active than comparable countries in terms of bilateral diplomatic engagement, ranking just 20th for this indicator in 2024, just behind Bangladesh. Because this indicator captures only engagement by leaders and foreign ministers, rather than officials, it may have been affected by the timing of the 2023 general election.
Another clear trend for New Zealand in the Asia Power Index is its declining positive “power gap”. This secondary analysis measures the interplay between a country’s resources – what they have – and their influence – what they do with what they have.
In 2019, New Zealand had a positive power gap of 2.1 points, making it an “overperformer” in the region. But this positive power gap has declined in each year of the Index, and in 2024 has fallen to just 0.2. If this trend continues, New Zealand is likely to record a negative power gap in the next edition of the Asia Power Index, making it an “underperformer” in Asia.
New Zealand’s only gains were in the area of cultural influence, or the ability to shape international public opinion through cultural appeal and interaction.
While the Asia Power Index can give a sense of New Zealand’s overall standing in Asia, it shouldn’t be read as a “foreign policy scorecard” – for a couple of reasons. First, except possibly for the region’s superpowers, most countries don’t seek power per se – they seek to advance their interests. Power can help, but so can ideas, institutions and rules.
Second, the Index focuses on a specific, albeit broadly defined region. Only one Pacific Island Country, Papua New Guinea, is included. Given New Zealand’s geographic location and identity as a Pacific country, the Asia Power Index doesn’t give a full accounting of New Zealand’s international engagement.
Nonetheless, the Index can help provide an evidence base for a conversation around New Zealand’s standing in Asia. The finding that New Zealand’s positive power gap has been declining suggests that Wellington has the resources to increase its regional contribution, should it decide to do so.
Asia Media Centre