Japan’s Politics Get Messy

The election ended a decade of comparatively stable Japanese political leadership, established by former PM Abe and continued under his successors Suga and Kishida. It leaves Japan facing a prolonged period of messy coalition politics. The result will disappoint those hoping for Japan to take a stronger international role, but it demonstrates a more dynamic political process than is often assumed by outsiders. In its increasing diversity of parties and focus on day to day issues, Japan’s politics is looking much like that of other stressed, rich countries.

In the lead-up to the election, polls had warned that Japanese voters were deeply unhappy with the LDP’s poor governance, particularly its ties to the manipulative Unification Church and its failure to deal adequately with a financial scandal around political slush funds.

Yet the public verdict was even harsher than expected.

Following his election as LDP leader in September, Ishiba Shigeru called an immediate Lower House election, hoping for a solid public mandate to put the LDP back on track.

His strategy backfired. The LDP/Komeito government won only 215 of 465 seats, 73 fewer than the last election and well short of the 233 majority needed.

The result has plunged Japan into uncertainty.

New Zealanders, well used to this situation under MMP, would settle in for weeks of coalition negotiations before a government emerged on the basis of agreements hammered out between the parties. But in Japan there is a deadline: the Lower House must elect a new Prime Minister within 30 days. Further, it is not clear the parties will be able or willing to negotiate detailed agreements before that point, leaving whoever is PM open to later ambush through votes of no confidence.

Behind the scenes negotiations are already underway, and many scenarios are likely to be tried and tested over the next few weeks.

The opposition, led by the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), has the numbers on paper to form a new government without the LDP. Yet that seems the least likely outcome.

The LDP remains the largest party. With Komeito, it still controls the Upper House. Meanwhile the opposition is handicapped by major policy disagreements on issues like defence, tax and nuclear energy.

The LDP will need to cooperate with one or both of the next two largest parties after the CDP – the Osaka-based Japan Innovation Party, or the Democratic Party of the People (DPP). The latter was only established in 2020, but quadrupled its seats in this election to 28. Both parties have ruled out joining a coalition with the LDP, but, as New Zealanders know well, proximity to power and the prospect of Cabinet seats have a wonderful ability to sway minds.

Ishiba’s position is perilous, yet he may survive the vote – which he will need to do to avoid becoming Japan’s shortest-lived post-war PM. He would then try to put together a government, most likely a minority coalition reliant on partners for support issue by issue.

Ishiba can legitimately claim not to be responsible for the debacles around political reform or the Unification Church. His main rival in the party, arch-conservative Takaichi Sanae, has herself been diminished by the loss of around one-third of her supporters. Would-be rivals may prefer to wait for clearer air rather than compete for what could be a poisoned chalice premiership.

Above all, a potentially even more significant election looms shortly, with Upper House elections scheduled for July 2025. That provides an opportunity for the LDP to regroup, but also for the opposition to consolidate and push for a majority position in both Houses. CDP leader Noda has hinted that patience may be required before Japan gets used to rotating parties in and out of power. If Noda is to become PM, that is probably his moment.

For now Japan faces a prolonged period of uncertainty and coalition horse-trading around Cabinet seats and policies.

This outcome will disappoint those who rejoiced in the firm leadership and increased status that Japan enjoyed internationally under Abe, Suga and Kishida. Facing substantial international challenges in Russia, China, North Korea, and possibly a Trump-led USA, a distracted leadership will not help Japan project stability and confidence in the region.

Yet there is more of interest in this election result than just the quality of leadership.

Just as Japan’ s economy appears to be emerging from three decades of deflation to look more like other G7 economies – positive interest rates and low inflation but also endemic population decline and low growth - Japan’s politics too look more similar to some of its democratic peers.

First, voters have made very clear they are fed up with their political system and the LDP. Whoever wins government is going to have to legislate further political reform, and to somehow rebuild trust in the country’s leaders.

Second, voters have signalled they care most about issues affecting their daily livelihood: especially the cost of living and low wages, as well as vexing local issues such as the botched introduction of a national identity card, the continued inability of women to retain their surnames on marriage, and the risk of reopening nuclear power plants.

While Japan does not show the sort of polarization that has characterized European and US elections in recent years, voters are at least being offered a greater range of choice.

Over the last 30 years all parties moved towards the centre. Voting rates have declined (54% in the latest election, the third-lowest on record) and young people are showing less interest in politics. Voters have been put off by the “same-old” line-up of parties.

But in the last five years, new parties have emerged across the board from the far left to the far right. The new parties expound clear (if simplistic) positions in ways that voters find easy to understand. Much of the success of the DPP for example appears to be due to its breezy promise to “increase take-home wages”.

Finally, this election has given a boost to diversity in Japan’s infamously aged and male Diet. Voters dumped a number of older men, many tainted by financial scandal, and welcomed in younger candidates. Successful LDP candidates include the Diet’s youngest ever member 25-year old Ozora Koki (25 is the minimum age for election) and Eri Alifiya, a daughter of Uighur and Uzbek parents. More women candidates stood (23%) and more won seats (16%) than ever before – though these numbers are still well short of developed world standards. It is a safe bet that the next Cabinet will contain many more women than the current two.

For New Zealand and regional partners, all this may mean a less outwardly confident Japan internationally. Yet unless the CDP actually takes power, Japan’s trade and security policies are not likely to change. Both of the parties being wooed by the LDP - the Japan Innovation Party and the DPP – are hawkish on security and support increasing Japan’s military spending to 2% of GDP (they differ from the LDP only in that they do not want to raise taxes to pay for it). With leaders preoccupied by domestic issues, Japan’s quietly efficient bureaucrats are likely to ensure stability in foreign policy.

For Japanese the election signals a turn to a more uncertain political climate in which politicians will need to work harder to listen to voters and respond to their concerns, from serious political reform to improving their daily lives. A more diverse Diet may well lead to changes in social policy – in gender and LGBT rights for example – as the stranglehold of the

LDP erodes. It will be more dynamic, more messy and more unpredictable - a bit like the kind of democracy we know in New Zealand.