Asia-Pac Roundtable: Collapse of The Order?

The “collapse of the international order?”: Reflections from Southeast Asia

Earlier this month as part of the Asia New Zealand Foundation’s Track II delegation I attended the 37th Asia-Pacific Roundtable (APR). The theme: ‘Crisis in an Interregnum’.

The APR is the signature international conference of the Institute of Strategic & International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia. At its core, the APR is a Southeast Asian conference discussing key issues impacting on the Asia-Pacific. It is one of the region’s premier Track-Two gatherings and is ranked among the world’s top 20 think-tank strategic-security focused conferences.

The event attracted 300 thinkers from various backgrounds (officials, academics, security professionals, think tankers, journalists, students, etc) from across the region to discuss issues impacting the Asia-Pacific. It was an opportune time given it came hot on the heels of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.

A common refrain was that international order was increasingly multipolar, and we were witnessing the “collapse of the international order”. Indeed, Malaysia’s Prime Minister said the postwar system “held much promise in the rhetoric but [has] proven to be a dismal failure in the delivery”.

While the US (many speakers referred to “the US” and “the West” as seemingly the same thing) and China loom large in the region, neither is capable of establishing regional predominance as new centres of power assert themselves, especially in the developing world.

Many attendees seemed to welcome this – it means, apparently, that small and medium powers will have more agency.

At the same time, the system is increasingly “fragile”. It is far from clear, in my opinion, that multipolarity will deliver a net benefit; historically, many multipolar systems have proved to be unstable – there are many permutations, the balance of power can be difficult to discern, and small miscalculations can draw in many others leading to large conflagrations. Alliance management is also complicated.

We are entering a realist world increasingly dominated by power. The US and China typify this – sure, they may espouse values, talk about the “rules and order”, how they are working to achieve “harmony for mankind”, etc, but the imperatives of waging a strategic competition – and the growing number of challenges that confront them across multiple planes and in an increasing number of places – mean they are compelled to prioritise their strategic interests above all else.

After all, what’s the point of being pure if one loses the game? Why follow the rules if it leaves you worse off as the other side cheats and accrues relative gains in the process? 

As such, the ability and willingness to enforce as well as uphold laws and norms declines. States are freer to take action and ‘settle scores’, with tensions increasing and the number of conflicts multiplying.

US soft power declines while China’s influence strategy becomes more sophisticated

The increasingly brutal civil war in Myanmar was top of mind at the event while the war in Ukraine was viewed as a “white people’s war”. The word hypocrisy was in high usage; if Western states don’t care about Myanmar, why should Southeast Asia care about Ukraine?

The idea that a Russian victory would embolden others, such as China, to become more assertive throughout the Indo-Pacific was not penetrating - although it resonates in the Philippines.

The destruction of Gaza and the US’s robust support for Israel reinforced the sense of hypocrisy.

At the Roundtable Chinese speakers played on this, pointing out that Beijing supports a two-state solution for Israel/Palestine and are “friends to all Muslims”. Such remarks received rounds of applause from parts of the audience. There was, of course, no mention of what has happened to the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.

US soft power has declined while China’s has risen, indicated by a new poll showing that just over half (50.5%) of Southeast Asians would now prefer to align with China over the US if they were forced to choose between the two.

One journalist suggested this is temporary and will change once the war in Gaza ends. Perhaps, but others note that the growth in Chinese soft power is due to multiple factors:

Chinese investment and trade, with the Belt and Road not only financing large infrastructure but also funnelling down to community initiatives; Chinese technology, which is considered high-quality and sometimes superior to alternatives; PR campaigns about climate change and human rights that equalise the ‘values’ narrative of the West (“I learnt everything from you, Dad” someone amusingly quipped). Increasingly tailored and sophisticated social media campaigns are also underway, including through Xiaohongshu – also known as ‘Little Red Book’ (now is that on the nose or what?) – a Chinese social media/e-commerce platform likened to Instagram that touts China as ‘the Motherland’.

This seems clumsy and unconvincing to some, but one person noted their Malay-Chinese parents, despite not speaking Chinese and never having travelled there, had at an advanced age suddenly become Sinophiles.  

Chinese speakers repeatedly criticised US policy on advanced technology, semiconductors, space (NASA is banned from co-operating with China) and EVs.

The US should co-operate with Beijing on these issues, otherwise it will be “doomed”. We were also told to prepare for “inevitable peace” and not to “impose your god on me”.

I could not determine how all of this was viewed by the audience. Presumably to some it reinforced the sense of US hypocrisy – “How does the US semiconductor ban fit into the rules-based order?” one person asked.

On the sidelines many assessments of China’s messaging and PR were offered – it was amusing to some, arrogant to others, odd, clumsy and successful for those angry at US/Western policies and happy to see the West taken down a peg.

Indeed, there was applause after one attendee went after a speaker from the EU, saying “Colonial states [should] admit their historical wrongs”.

The South China Sea, no ASEAN centrality and Alignments between the Superpowers

Despite China’s territorial disputes with the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei over the South China Sea, there is no solidarity among the members of ASEAN. The Philippines – which is facing daily intimidation by China – may have been “hung out to dry” by the region.

ASEAN centrality is something nice for officials to talk about but it appears only skin-deep. In this context, China can “pick off each state one by one”, and the ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asia Summit are seen as failures. Nonetheless, according to some attendees ,“If ASEAN didn’t exist it would have to be created” because it’s the “only game in town”.

One expert I spoke to urged against the view that Southeast Asia would inevitably be dominated by Chinese hegemony; expect countries in the region to “ping-pong” in different directions Some may be trillion dollar economies in a decade and, with that will come greater military power and confidence to stand up for themselves or align with the US.

The advantage of the latter is that the geographic distance of the US means it isn’t viewed as constituting a potential threat to most in SEA (unlike China), while Beijing’s bullying, arrogance, history with the region, and missed opportunities – such as delivering on pledges to Duterte – mean its current gains may not last. At this year's Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore the US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin described this a part of a "new convergence [of states] propelled by a shared vision and a shared sense of mutual obligation.", and in Washington's view broadly aligned with US policy. This depends, however, on where one is sitting : what is viewed as "convergence" in Washington, might be seen more as hedging by ASEAN nations. 

Perceptions of New Zealand’s Foreign Policy, AUKUS and our Space Prowess

There was a sense that New Zealand had lost its way on foreign policy in recent years, with Wellington not showing the same level of interest in the world, or ASEAN, that it once did.

I was told that New Zealand can’t expect to receive benefits from ASEAN members unless it turned up, and showed interest not just in trade, but also in security issues. The recent trips by Luxon, Collins and Peters abroad, and the pivot to a more traditional approach, mean this perception has now changed, with experts saying in the eyes of Southeast Asia “New Zealand was back”.

Some conversations turned to AUKUS. Several people seemed to know that New Zealand, like Japan, was involved in conversations to join AUKUS Pillar 2. Most thought it logical that New Zealand join despite the possibility it could lead to trade consequences with China, with one person sympathising: “China is everyone’s problem”.

There was surprise and admiration when attendees were told that Rocket Lab’s success meant New Zealand hosted seven rocket launches last year – the fourth-most globally (!).

Perhaps more than anything else this could put New Zealand truly back on the map – technological prowess. There is a clear opportunity here for New Zealand. Hence Judith Collins’s recent globe-trotting to promote it. In my opinion lobbying and touting New Zealand’s space and tech sector abroad requires major resourcing – New Zealand should assemble a group of semi-formal emissaries and dispatch them on continual missions.

Final Thoughts for a “post-normal” age and Lessons for New Zealand

Convincing forecasts were in short supply in Malaysia. We are in a “post-normal” age, the future is more unpredictable than at any time in recent memory, and many states are acting as though there are “rules for thee but not for me”.

Everyone appears a bit edgy – there is a collective sense that developments over the short term are fraught with danger, but that if we can get beyond this period things might settle down (I have no idea if this is true or merely a collective coping mechanism). We are either at an inflexion point or, perhaps, already on the other side of one.

What are some lessons for New Zealand? Presence, visits and competent energy is important; words are nice but practical effort matters more.

Likewise, we should pay attention, and communicate that we understand, the security issues of others, they will be more likely to take our economic concerns into consideration if we do.

Indeed, given the hesitance in many quarters (well, the ones that matter the most to us) to forge FTAs, contracts that allow firms in our most promising sectors – space, high tech and software, etc – to survive and thrive may require strategic agreements. Perhaps Rocket Lab is a useful model for this.

+ Opinions expressed in this article are those of the author +

- Asia Media Centre