The Japanese have a phrase 行動する前に理解する(Kōdō suru mae ni rikai suru) that translates into English as ‘one should make sure to understand the circumstances before taking action.’
This phrase came to mind regarding the newly elected Luxon administration's need to thoroughly understand circumstances before shaping its foreign policy, a reflection stemming from my recent visit to Tokyo with a delegation from the Asia New Zealand Foundation.
New Zealand Prime Minister, Christopher Luxon. Image: National FB page.
It is a statement of fact that the Luxon administration confronts the most challenging foreign policy environment that any New Zealand government has faced since 1986, when the US-New Zealand leg of the ANZUS alliance was suspended.
For evidence, one need only consider Defence Minister Andrew Little’s August 2023 statement, which introduced a trio of key documents: our first National Security Strategy, the Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) Policy and Strategy Statement, and a statement of Future Forces Design Principles.
Little noted that “in 2023 we do not live in a benign security environment.” To boot, the MOD Policy and Strategy Statement underlined that “the wider Indo-Pacific is now the central global theatre for strategic competition.”
Located in the heart of the Indo-Pacific, the Japanese are at the frontline of this strategic competition. What insights can we learn from Tokyo’s foreign policy?
First, the Japanese aren’t directly asking regional states to choose sides in the emerging US-China rivalry. Instead, Tokyo assists them by building up their capacity. The aim is to empower regional states to resist challenges to their sovereignty.
Over the last decade, Japan has provided various Southeast Asian states including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam with defensive kit, including coast guard patrol vessels, surveillance aircraft, and radar technology.
During our time in Tokyo, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida was on visits to Malaysia and the Philippines. He announced an accelerated schedule for the implementation of a new Official Security Assistance programme, a direct manifestation of Japan’s December 2022 National Security Strategy, which is aimed at 'maintaining a Policy of Proactive Contribution to Peace.'
Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida's state visit in the Philippines, meeting with Philippine President Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr. on November 3, 2023, Image: Prime Minister's Office of Japan.
There is no guarantee that the Japanese approach will succeed, but it is far likelier to work than the alternative that presents regional states with a ‘with us or against us’ choice.
The Japanese experience is relevant to New Zealand’s foreign policy, especially in the Pacific Islands region, where the key word is sovereignty.
The Pacific Island states’ principal challenges focus on climate change, health, and education. In their own way, these are also sovereignty issues. How so? A state whose borders are being eroded by the effects of climate change and lacks a robust health and educational system will eventually find itself powerless to pushback against external states that seek to undermine its sovereignty.
Fortunately, climate change, health, and education are domains where New Zealand can realistically intensify its partnerships with like-minded states such as Japan and Australia through targeted state capacity aid.
The second insight that the Japanese example provides is that states that are not ‘Great Powers’ can nevertheless exercise significant agency in promoting stability in international politics.
Following the US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017, Japan, under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, took a leadership role by advancing the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)
Japan has also invested in its alliance with the US and responded vigorously to South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s initiative to improve relations with Japan. Both relationships are the strongest they have been in decades.
Moreover, Tokyo has pledged to increase defense spending from one to two percent of GDP by 2027.
These actions represent a significant contribution to regional order at a critical time of heightened instability.
How does the Japanese example apply to New Zealand?
It's well known that we have agency in the emerging international order, but this serves as an important reminder for the Luxon administration.
The Ardern (2017-2023) and Hipkins (2023) administrations sought to exercise agency by alerting the New Zealand electorate that the international environment has taken a turn for the worse.
Ardern and Hipkins also strategically messaged the international community that New Zealand has a vested interest in working with allies and partners to uphold the existing rules-based international order.
Now, the Luxon administration steps in, and its actions in the coming months will attract attention from various groups, including states with differing degrees of revisionist ambition, our treaty ally Australia, regional partners with similar views, and the New Zealand electorate.
Ironically, although the National-ACT-New Zealand First coalition has assumed power with promises of superior governance, particularly on domestic issues, it's likely that their success over the next three years will hinge as much on their foreign policy management as on their domestic governance.
(L-R) NZ First's Winston Peters, National's Christopher Luxon, and ACT's David Seymore, coalition government. Image: Luxon's FB page.
About the author:
Nicholas Khoo is an Associate Professor in the Politics Program at the University of Otago and a Research Fellow at the Institute for Indo-Pacific Affairs in Christchurch, New Zealand. His specialisation includes Chinese foreign policy, great power politics, and Asian security. This opinion piece is based by the author's visit to Tokyo from November 4 to 8, sponsored by the Asia New Zealand Foundation.
-Asia Media Centre
