Yoon Suk Yeol Shakes the Foundations of South Korean Democracy

It's hard to know which way to look at the current crisis  – whether to focus on undoubted risks to democracy and stability in one of Asia’s leading economies, or to stress the success and resilience with which Korea’s people and institutions have responded so far.. 

While there is still plenty of the story to play out, at this point it appears that the democratic process is prevailing over a dangerous if ham-fisted attempt at overturning it – but also that Korea retains some disturbing elements of its former authoritarian culture that are proving hard to shake off.

Many leaders around the world are finding governing tough lately.  Of 12 democratic elections held in East Asia and Australasia since the COVID pandemic began to ease in 2022, nearly all have seen a rejection of incumbent governments, including in New Zealand, as well as Japan, Indonesia and Australia.  In only one country (Mongolia) was a party and leader re-elected. Six elections in South Asia in the last year alone have resulted in four changes of government.  India, the largest democracy of all, saw a stinging rebuke to the Modi government. Outside Asia, we are seeing hitherto stable political processes come under challenge in leading democracies such as the US, UK, France and Germany.  

But Yoon’s response to his political frustration was – inexcusably and inexplicably - to try to torpedo democracy entirely.  That he failed is a tribute to the way the Korean people were able to exercise their constitutional processes. 

Yet the crisis is not over.  In the next few months, as the lengthy process of the trial of the president unwinds at the Constitutional Court, Koreans will need to consider a series of difficult questions about what took place and why.  Their responses will affect Korea’s view of itself and its relations with the rest of the world.

Yoon’s sudden decision to impose martial law seemed at first to be a brain explosion – a meltdown brought on by political frustration with entrenched toxic opposition in the National Assembly (where the opposition has a majority), stress at attacks on his wife and close aides, and his own personal unpopularity.

Disgraced South Korean President Yoon / Image Wikimedia

But details emerging around the background to the events suggest that Yoon and at least some supporters had thought hard about the option of martial law in advance, and that they could well have been successful. 

Korean media report that a good deal of planning had been going on for some months, apparently coordinated by the former Minister of Defence, Kim Yong Hyun, now under arrest and recovering from attempted suicide. The declaration was made late at night when most parliamentarians had left the National Assembly; the President appears to have ordered the arrest of numerous political leaders (including from his own party); and to have instructed the military to prevent National Assembly members from entering the building and voting down martial law.  His initial order threatened to close all TV and radio stations and take control of media. 

Why and how this plotting failed is yet to be explained – but it appears that ham-fisted execution may have been as important as the rapid response of the National Assembly.  We will need to wait a bit more to find out how close Korea really came to the suspension of democracy.

Koreans are all the more shocked at the crisis given the justifiable celebration that greeted their successful and largely peaceful emergence from authoritarian rule less than 40 years ago.  Bitter recall of that struggle has been evident among Yoon opponents this time around, both those old enough to remember and those who learned about it at school. Yet the attempt to impose martial law, however poorly executed, suggests that old habits die hard among at least some of the Korean elite.  To justify his actions Yoon has reached back to the language of dictators everywhere in linking his opponents baselessly to communism and North Korea.  And in their fervour to oppose him, his  opponents have sometimes behaved little better.  The opposition cited Yoon’s pro-Japan and pro-US stance as a basis for their first attempt at impeachment last week.

Difficult legal processes now lie ahead as many of the country’s military, police and national intelligence leaders are likely to go on trial as well as the President and Defence Minister. 

Yoon has vowed to contest the impeachment charge vigorously – and may only need one sympathetic judge on the Court to veto his conviction.  Meanwhile the opposition leader Lee Jae-Myung also faces trial on corruption charges early in 2025. All these trials will keep passions on both sides inflamed, and will severely test the ability of the Korean judicial and political systems to keep the peace. 

The interim government, headed by former PM Han Duck-soo, now acting President, will be sorely tested in response.  Han is a well-respected and experienced technocrat, but as a non-political appointee he has no political base for his leadership. If he attempts to continue the conservative agenda of the Yoon government he is likely to be attacked by the left, and is vulnerable to indictment himself for his role in the martial law debacle.

The best we might expect will be a steady and cautious hand in running the country, with no policy change until a new president and government is voted in – a process which could take as long as eight months.

Lee Jae Myung, the Opposition leader tipped as possible next president/ Image Wikimedia

With the ruling conservative party (the PPP) deeply scarred, when a new government finally emerges it is most likely to be left-leaning, perhaps led by Lee Jae-Myung.  If so, it is likely to take a more independent approach that Yoon’s, less focused on security, less anchored to the US, and more favourable to China.  It would probably be more diplomatic in its approach to North Korea and Russia, oppose involvement in Ukraine, and revert to the left’s traditional suspicious approach to Japan. The progress made in the last two years in rebuilding the US/Japan/South Korea triangle could be in some jeopardy. 

All this would complicate the relationship with the US, Japan, UK and perhaps the EU.  ASEAN and other regional partners may be more relaxed.  In the Global South, a more independent Korea approach may well be seen positively, in keeping with the more multipolar world system that is emerging.

However a weak interim government will not be well placed to deal with the expected challenge from the US under President Trump. 

Security issues will be particularly difficult – finding a robust way of dealing with the newly re-minted alliance between North Korea and Russia, and keeping the US alliance afloat. 

Under President Yoon, South Korea showed interest in joining AUKUS, but that interest may not survive a change of government.   Korea’s participation in the IP4 group of NATO observers (South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand) may well continue as a discussion framework for regional issues, but a progressive government is unlikely to show any enthusiasm for closer cooperation with NATO or other forms of regional collective security.

One upside however could be the likely loss of the momentum that has been building behind the idea of South Korean developing its own nuclear weapons.

In retrospect, it seems clear that Yoon’s lack of political experience has rebounded badly on him – and Korea.  A life-long lawyer, he rose to be Prosecutor-General before being propelled directly into the presidency in 2022.  In office he has seemed more comfortable proclaiming top-down orders and insisting on loyalty from below than indulging in the indispensable give-and-take of politics. 

Under pressure he reverted to an older style of authoritarian politics that Koreans thought they had left behind.  They are paying the price today.

Asia Media Centre